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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The American Antitrust Institute (“AAI”) is an independent non-profit
educational, research, and advocacy organization devoted to advancing the
role of competition in the economy, protecting consumers, and sustaining
the vitality of the antitrust laws. The AAI is managed by its Board of
Directors, with the guidance of an Advisory Board that consists of over 115
prominent antitrust lawyers, law professors, economists, and business
leaders. See http://www.antitrustinstitute.org. The AAI frequently appears
as amicus curiae, and presented oral argument in Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v.
linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1109 (2009). The Board of Directors is
particularly concerned that the opinion below entirely disregards non-price
competition,

potentially

immunizing

anticompetitive

conduct

in

pharmaceutical and other markets in which price competition may be
attenuated, and that it sets too high a standard for considering price effects in
a monopoly-preserving merger.1
FED. R. APP. P. 29(a) STATEMENT
The AAI has the consent of all the parties, Plaintiffs-Appellants
Federal Trade Commission and State of Minnesota, and Defendant-Appellee

1

The AAI’s Board of Directors alone has approved the filing of this brief;
the individual views of members of the Advisory Board may differ from
AAI’s positions.
1

Lundbeck, Inc., to submit this amicus brief.
FED. R. APP. P. 29(c)(5) STATEMENT
No counsel for a party has authored this brief in whole or in part, and
no party, party’s counsel, or any other person or entity – other than the AAI
or its counsel – has contributed money that was intended to fund preparing
or submitting this brief.

Certain members of AAI’s Advisory Board

represent plaintiffs in related litigation against Lundbeck, but they played no
role in drafting or funding the brief, nor participated in the AAI Board of
Directors’ deliberations over the brief.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The basis for the District Court’s ruling was its view that cross-price
elasticity of demand was “very low” between the two drugs acquired by
Lundbeck, and therefore that they could not be in the same relevant market.2
AAI urges reversal on three grounds. First, assuming arguendo that crossprice elasticity was low – even if it were zero – the court’s approach
fundamentally misapprehended the law.

A lack of price competition

between two functionally interchangeable products does not preclude a
determination that they are in the same relevant market. Second, regardless
of “low” cross-price elasticity, the acquisition removed an actual or potential
2

Following the District Court, we refer to Appellee-Defendant Lundbeck
and its predecessor Ovation, Inc. as “Lundbeck.”
2

constraint on a monopolist’s ability to exercise monopoly power and was
therefore anticompetitive and illegal under Section 7 of the Clayton Act and
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. And third, the court’s finding of “low” crossprice elasticity should be rejected because it cannot be reconciled with the
rest of its findings and is otherwise riddled with errors.
Strictly speaking, the court made a “cross-elasticity” finding only
indirectly, extrapolating from an institutional peculiarity. The court believed
that because many doctors choose drugs based on quality rather than price,
hospitals that actually purchase the drugs and choose whether to stock them
in their formularies would be unable to foster price competition among drug
manufacturers. And yet, on every other dimension the court’s findings show
the products to be closely interchangeable economic substitutes. Moreover,
much of the court’s own reasoning was based on doctors’ differing views as
to safety and side effects. That is to say, the court found as a fact that these
products compete head to head on the basis of quality. The ruling therefore
directly conflicts with United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441
(1964), and FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986), which
hold that antitrust law protects quality competition as well as price
competition. Quality competition benefits consumers in its own right, and it

3

drives innovation. Indeed, it is where price competition lacks vigor that
non-price competition is most important.
With respect to price competition, the court essentially placed the
burden on the government to prove that but for the acquisition, the two
products would have competed on price. However, even if price were the
only concern, that is too stringent a test. Under the incipiency standard of
Section 7, and Section 2’s heightened concern over acquisitions by
monopolists, it is sufficient that Lundbeck has preempted the competitive
constraint that separately owned drugs would have provided.
Further, even if the evidence supported each of the District Court’s
findings of fact individually, the cross-elasticity ruling is seriously at odds
with almost the entire remainder of the opinion. The court ignored its own
findings demonstrating that Lundbeck and Abbott both considered that the
price of each of the products constrained the price of the other. Moreover,
on the court’s own findings, a determination of actual cross-price elasticity
would be logically impossible in this case. It cannot be measured where, as
here, the products in question were always controlled by the same
monopolist owner and essentially priced the same.

Finally, the court’s

conclusion that Lundbeck’s efforts to convince doctors to use NeoProfen
instead of Indocin would make no sense if the products were in the same

4

relevant market is exactly backwards; Lundbeck’s conduct would be
economically irrational if the products were not good economic substitutes.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT’S FINDINGS CLEARLY
DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PRODUCTS AT ISSUE ARE
CLOSELY INTERCHANGEABLE ECONOMIC
SUBSTITUTES
The District Court’s findings demonstrate the following beyond

serious doubt: Lundbeck was the maker of two functionally interchangeable
substitutes that were at best only mildly differentiated, and at the time of the
challenged acquisition it faced no other competition. The court summarized
its own findings as follows:
To treat [the medical condition in question] with drugs in the
United States, [doctors] may choose Indocin IV, . . . [or a]
generic [substitute for Indocin IV, which became available only
in 2010] . . . , or NeoProfen. [Doctors] pick NeoProfen or
Indocin IV to treat [that condition] for reasons such as
perceived differences in the drugs’ safety, differences in side
effects, or the presence or lack of long-term studies.
FF 116.

The findings of fact also show that the medical community

considered the drugs largely interchangeable, or at any rate lacked consensus
that one was superior.3 Most hospitals stocked either of the two drugs, but

3

The court credited medical experts who considered the drugs
interchangeable. FF 98, 102, 103, 105; cf. FF 101. Moreover, while some
witnesses preferred one of the drugs, they were divided among those who
preferred Indocin IV and those who preferred NeoProfen. Compare FF 100
5

not both. FF 94. Lundbeck’s effort to distinguish them in its customers’
minds was a high priority, FF 34, 81-87, but its materials show its
apprehension that customers would not be convinced.

FF 78-80.

Lundbeck’s best hope for distinguishing NeoProfen was lost when the Food
& Drug Administration rejected a label for NeoProfen that had been
proposed by Abbott Laboratories, from which Lundbeck acquired the drug.
The FDA rejected the label because it would have stated that NeoProfen was
superior to Indocin IV, and the agency found that claim unsubstantiated. FF
61. Indeed, despite Lundbeck’s marketing effort, and despite NeoProfen’s
alleged superiority, as of the time of the decision below, Indocin IV was still
prescribed substantially more often than NeoProfen. FF 94.
The findings of fact also show that Lundbeck viewed Indocin IV and
NeoProfen as highly competitive.

Lundbeck estimated that “NeoProfen

[would] capture a significant portion of the pharmaceutical PDA market at
the expense of Indocin IV.” FF 79 (noting expected sales loss “due to new

and 108 (preference for Indocin IV) with FF 99, 104, 106, and 107
(preference for NeoProfen). The court also credited “[p]ublished clinical
studies indicat[ing]” that the active ingredients in the two drugs are “equally
efficacious,” finding as a matter of fact that each of them is “approximately
75% to 90% effective.” FF 21. Finally, the court credited Lundbeck
internal strategy documents finding that among the reasons that some
customers discontinued NeoProfen is that “[s]afety advantages (e.g. renal
function) [were] not perceived as a feature/benefit significant enough to
replace Indocin IV as the first line therapy . . . .” FF 84.
6

competition (generic entry and NeoProfen).”); see also FF 80 (describing
“competitive threats” to Indocin IV from NeoProfen). Indeed, the basic
rationale for the acquisition was that “[a]cquiring NeoProfen will allow us to
cannibalize our Indocin IV sales in a controlled manner, retain sales for both
products and continue to grow total company sales in the PDA market with
an exclusively protected product.” FF 79.
In short, these two products were designed for the same use, and
despite whatever differentiation they may actually possess, they were
economic substitutes in the sense that sales of one came directly at the
expense of the other.
II.

IN DETERMINING THE RELEVANT MARKET, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED BY IGNORING NON-PRICE COMPETITION
The result below rested entirely on the District Court’s finding that

cross-price elasticity between the two drugs was “very low” and therefore
the products could not be in the same relevant market. Even assuming
arguendo that cross-price elasticity was low, it does not follow that they are
in different product markets. Despite the court’s apparently contrary view,
core values protected by our antitrust law include quality competition and
innovation over time. As the Supreme Court explained in Continental Can:
Interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of demand are not
to be used to obscure competition but to “recognize competition
where, in fact, competition exists.”
7

378 U.S. at 453 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
326 (1962)); accord United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 866 F.2d
242, 246 (8th Cir. 1988). Like the trial court in Continental Can, the court
here “employed an unduly narrow construction of the ‘competition’
protected by § 7 and of ‘reasonable interchangeability of use or the crosselasticity of demand’ in judging the facts of this case.” 378 U.S. at 452.
A.

Quality Competition and Innovation are Core Antitrust
Values

Quality competition and consumer choice are values protected by the
antitrust laws, even in the absence of price competitiveness in a given
market. The Supreme Court has so held many times. See, e.g., FTC v. Ind.
Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459-60 (1986) (a “refusal to compete with
respect to the package of services . . . , no less than a refusal to compete with
respect to the price term of an agreement, impairs the ability of the market to
advance social welfare”); Aspen Skiiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605-07, 610 (1985) (noting harm from the
unavailability of the all-Aspen ticket, which deprived consumers of the
ability to “make their own choice on these matters of quality”); Nat’l
Collegiate Athl. Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984) (finding
that athletic association’s actions “can be viewed as procompetitive” because
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they “widen consumer choice”); cf. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad.
Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (treating musical composers as horizontal
competitors even though price competition likely lacking).
The significance of non-price competition has been reaffirmed by this
Court, see, e.g., Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Mem’l Park Cemetery Ass’n,
666 F.2d 1130, 1138 (8th Cir. 1981) (finding trade association rule illegal
because it “stunts rather than develops trade . . . and limits consumer
choice”), and by the other Circuits, see, e.g., United States v. Dentsply Int’l,
Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 194 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding it “anticompetitive [to] . . .
limit[] the choices of products open to dental laboratories.”); Conwood Co.,
L.P. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 789 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding
antitrust injury where conduct “caused higher prices and reduced consumer
choice, both of which are harmful to competition”); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n,
895 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 1990) (boycott by doctors of chiropractors was
“anticompetitive [because it] . . . interfere[s] with the consumer’s free choice
to take the product of his liking”); Glen Holly Ent., Inc. v. Tektronix, Inc.,
343 F.3d 1000, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting definition of “antitrust
injury” that would recognize only increased price or decreased innovation;
finding antitrust injury because defendant’s conduct “detrimentally changed
the market make-up and limited consumers’ choice to one source of

9

output.”); see generally Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the
“Consumer Choice” Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 Antitrust L. J. 175, 18991 & nn. 45-48 (2007) (citing cases).
Non-price competition has been of particular concern in merger
review under § 7 because “expansion through merger is more likely to
reduce available consumer choice while providing no increase in industry
capacity, jobs or output.” Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 345 n.72; see also
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 363, 368 (1968)
(finding a bank merger illegal under § 7 because it would limit consumer
choice as to “price, variety of credit arrangements, convenience of location,
attractiveness of physical surroundings, credit information, investment
advice, service charges, personal accommodations, advertising, [and]
miscellaneous special and extra services.”).
For more than two decades the Horizontal Merger Guidelines have
recognized that mergers may be anticompetitive when they reduce non-price
competition.

When the antitrust enforcement agencies first issued joint

merger guidelines in 1992, they took the view that, in addition to their power
over price, “[s]ellers with market power . . . may lessen competition on
dimensions other than price, such as product quality, service, or innovation.”

10

U.S. Dep’t of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 0.1 n.6
(1992). The revised Guidelines of 2010 go further:
Enhanced market power can also be manifested in non-price
terms and conditions that adversely affect customers, including
reduced product quality, reduced product variety, reduced
service, or diminished innovation. Such non-price effects may
coexist with price effects, or can arise in their absence. . . . [The
agencies’ usual market definition methodology, which focuses
on “small but significant and non-transitory” price changes,] is
used because normally it is possible to quantify [such changes,]
not because price effects are more important than non-price
effects. . . .
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §§ 1, 4.1.2
(2010).
B.

Continental Can and Tenet Health Care Control This Case

In particular, two decisions emphasizing these non-price competition
values, one from the Supreme Court and one from this Circuit, control this
case. First, in Continental Can, a maker of metal containers acquired a
maker of glass containers. The Court rejected a bench verdict for defendants
that found glass and metal containers to be in separate product markets.
Although the trial court found significant non-price competition between the
metal and glass container industries, it found the acquisition in “the category
of the conglomerate combination” rather than horizontal. 378 U.S. at 449.
Because of differences in manufacturing process and end use, the trial court
thought “the Government failed to make ‘appropriate distinctions . . .
11

between inter-industry or overall commodity competition and the type of
competition between products with reasonable interchangeability of use and
cross-elasticity of demand which has Clayton Act significance.’” Id. at 44849 (quoting District Court).
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding, “that the demand for one
[product] is not particularly or immediately responsive to changes in the
price of the other [is] relevant . . . but not determinative of the product
market issue.” Id. at 455; see also id. at 450 (noting that “particular user[s] .
. . do[] not shift back and forth from day to day as price and other factors
might make desirable”). The Court canvassed findings and record evidence
of the marketing and technological innovation efforts of can and glass
companies to take each other’s market share, concluding that “[t]his [rivalry]
may not be price competition but is nevertheless meaningful competition
between interchangeable containers,” id. at 456, and that such competition
“was of the type and quality deserving of § 7 protection and therefore the
basis for defining a relevant product market,” id. at 449.
This Court’s decision in FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d
1045 (8th Cir. 1999), is also closely on point and rejects the approach to
market definition taken in this case.

12

Tenet reversed a district court’s

geographic market definition for excluding neighboring, but more expensive
hospitals. “In so doing,” the district court
underestimated the impact of nonprice competitive factors, such
as quality. . . . [O]ne reason for the significant amount of
migration from the [merging] hospitals to [those excluded from
the market] is the actual or perceived difference in quality of
care. The apparent willingness of Poplar Bluff residents to
travel for better quality care must be considered. . . .
[H]ealthcare decisions are based on factors other than price. . . .
The district court placed an inordinate emphasis on price
competition without considering the impact of a corresponding
reduction in quality.
Id. at 1054.
In short, the antitrust laws protect non-price competition as well as
price competition, which means that functionally interchangeable economic
substitutes can be in the same relevant market even when consumers are not
price sensitive.
C.

The Acquisition Caused Consumer Harm From the Loss of
Non-Price Competition

The District Court’s findings demonstrate that Lundbeck’s acquisition
resulted in unambiguous consumer losses apart from any price effects.
“Lundbeck stopped actively promoting Indocin IV” and “instructed its sales
representatives to focus on Indocin IV’s weaknesses relative to NeoProfen’s
anticipated benefits.” FF 81. This reduction and skewing of information
was a clear loss to hospitals, doctors, and patients, and a harm to the

13

competitive process. Indeed, in the drug field, information about safety and
effectiveness is critical. Had Lundbeck not acquired NeoProfen, it would
have had the incentive not only to promote Indocin IV’s benefits, but to fund
studies that might aid in that effort, while challenging the claims made for
NeoProfen. Moreover, the acquisition caused a loss of incentive to innovate.
A separate owner of either of the drugs, faced with quality competition,
would strive to respond with technological innovation and quality
improvements. Indeed, the most perverse consequence of the ruling is that it
is especially where market failure impedes price competition that non-price
rivalry is most important.
D.

The Court’s Holding Has Potentially Far-Reaching
Consequences

The

District

Court’s

holding

has

potentially far-reaching

consequences in other markets where competition occurs primarily, or
exclusively, over non-price attributes. First, by the court’s own findings of
fact, price-competitiveness is likely to be attenuated as to most prescription
drugs and for that matter as to most health care services. Failure to take
account of non-price competition therefore could effectively exempt a fair
portion of the health care sector from the antitrust laws. Cf. Phila. Nat’l
Bank, 374 U.S. at 350 (repeals of antitrust by implication are “strongly
disfavored”).
14

The District Court’s ruling would also have consequences in nonhealth-care markets. For example, it implies that the DOJ and FTC would
be precluded from weighing the effect of Internet and other media mergers
on consumers where the services are free (there is no cross-price elasticity
between products that are free). It would also preclude consideration of lost
editorial diversity or content in newspaper and media mergers, in which nonprice competition is routinely considered. See, e.g., United States v. Daily
Gazette Co., 567 F. Supp. 2d 859, 870 (S.D.W.Va. 2008); Reilly v.
MediaNews Group, Inc., 2007 WL 1068202, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Hawaii
ex rel. Anzai v. Gannett Pac. Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1249-50 (D. Haw.
1999), aff’d, 203 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding newspaper merger illegal
that would, among other things, “deprive newspaper readers of free and open
competition in the sale of daily newspapers and their differing editorial and
reportorial voices”).
Moreover, in any case in which price competitiveness is dampened,
but consumers value choice among non-price attributes, the District Court’s
ruling would produce this strange result: sellers of differentiated substitutes
with low cross-price elasticity could enter into market allocation agreements
without risk of antitrust liability because they are not horizontal competitors,
as the products are not in the same relevant market. Lundbeck, for example,
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rather than acquiring NeoProfen from Abbott Laboratories, might have just
agreed with Abbott that each would sell only to selected hospitals, even
though such an agreement between horizontal competitors would be plainly
illegal, and the loss of choice would reflect real consumer injury given the
District Court’s findings that many doctors prefer one or the other of the two
drugs.
III.

THE COURT’S MARKET DEFINITION FAILED TO TAKE
INTO ACCOUNT THAT AN INDEPENDENTLY OWNED
NEOPROFEN WOULD HAVE BEEN A CONSTRAINT ON
LUNDBECK’S PRICING
Even assuming arguendo that non-price competition is legally

irrelevant, the District Court was wrong to conclude that “low” cross-price
elasticity precluded the inclusion of both Indocin IV and NeoProfen in the
same product market. The fact that an independently owned NeoProfen
would have been a constraint on Lundbeck’s pricing – indeed, the only
competitive constraint – is sufficient to place it in the same relevant market.
Cross-price elasticity does not exist in a vacuum; it is a measure of
substitutability of two products at particular prices. See infra. When the
court found that cross-elasticity here was “low,” it did not specify what that
meant or conclude that it was so low that the potential anticompetitive
effects at issue in the case could not occur. On the contrary, it is clear that
NeoProfen was Indocin IV’s next-closest substitute, see FF 11, 12 (surgery
16

is “second-line” treatment of PDA and significantly more expensive than
drugs), and that an independently owned NeoProfen would have set a ceiling
on Lundbeck’s pricing of Indocin IV, and vice versa. Indeed, the court
recognized this constraint explicitly when it found that, “When launching
NeoProfen, an independent owner would not have disregarded Indocin IV’s
price.” FF 63. In contrast, a common owner can raise or maintain the price
of one of the drugs, knowing that the lower sales will be recaptured by the
other, as Lundbeck was well aware. FF 79 (“Acquiring NeoProfen will
allow us to cannibalize our Indocin IV sales in a controlled manner”).
The elimination by merger of an actual or potential price constraint on
a monopolist is anticompetitive, regardless of whether Indocin IV and
NeoProfen are considered to be in same relevant market. See Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469 n.15 (1992)
(“Whether considered in the conceptual category of ‘market definition’ or
‘market power,’ the ultimate inquiry is the same—whether . . . [one] market
will significantly restrain power in the [other] markets.”); 3 Phillip E.
Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 701d (3d ed. 2008)
(monopolist’s “acquisition of any firm that has the economic capabilities for
entry and is a more-than-fanciful possible entrant is presumptively
anticompetitive”); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966)
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(monopolist’s acquisition was illegal where it “eliminated any possibility of
an outbreak of competition that might have occurred”).
In any event, a proper definition of the relevant market would
recognize such a competitive constraint. See General Indus. Corp. v. Hartz
Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 805 (8th Cir. 1987) (“Defining a relevant
product market is primarily a process of describing those groups of
producers which, because of the similarity of their products, have the
ability—actual or potential—to take significant amounts of business away
from each other.”) (internal quote marks omitted) (emphasis added). A
failure to recognize such a constraint would also be inconsistent with Section
7’s “incipiency” mandate. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 323 n.39 (1962) (Section 7 of the Clayton Act is designed to protect
against anticompetitive dangers “in their incipiency”); accord Midwestern
Mach., Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 167 F.3d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 1999).
IV.

THE COURT’S MARKET DEFINITION AND THE
ELASTICITY FINDING ON WHICH IT DEPENDS CANNOT
BE RECONCILED WITH THE REST OF ITS FACT FINDINGS
Finally, this Court should not accept the District Court’s market

definition because the finding of low cross-price elasticity cannot be
reconciled with the facts as found and is riddled with other errors. See
Continental Can, 378 U.S. at 447-58 (reversing judgment as matter of law
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because trial court’s own findings of fact did not support its market
definition); Tenet, 186 F.3d at 1053-55 (reversing preliminary injunction
because trial court’s own findings of fact conflicted with its market
definition); see also Morgenstern v. Wilson, 29 F.3d 1291, 1295-97 (8th Cir.
1994) (reversing permanent injunction in jury trial, where market definition
was based on expert opinion but “indisputable record facts contradict or
otherwise render the opinion unreasonable”).
A.

The Elasticity Finding is Deeply Suspect on Its Face

The elasticity finding depended on the informal opinion of a
Lundbeck expert, FF115,4 and implicitly on the testimony of eight doctors
who said they do not consider the price of the drug if there is a meaningful
difference in safety or effectiveness. However, the court’s other findings of
fact demonstrate that a substantial number of doctors were largely
indifferent between the two drugs. See infra note 3. In any event, even if
4

Even though the court found as a fact that cross-price elasticity is “very
low,” FF 116, the court may have meant to imply that its ultimate finding
rested merely on Plaintiffs’ burden of proof. According to the court,
Plaintiffs’ economic expert did not offer an opinion as to cross-elasticity. FF
114; cf. FF 111. Yet, in its denial of Lundbeck’s motion for summary
judgment, the District Court recognized that even the total absence of crosselasticity evidence does not preclude a finding in favor of Plaintiffs’
proposed market. FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 2009 WL 2215006, at *2 n.2 (D.
Minn., July 21, 2009). Moreover, if the failure of proof were the court’s
rationale, it would be error because, as we will explain, it would be literally
impossible in this case for either party accurately to estimate cross-elasticity.
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most consumers are not price sensitive, that does not in itself prove that
cross-price elasticity is low. See United States v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d
1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is possible for only a few customers who
switch to alternatives to make [a] price increase unprofitable, thereby
protecting a larger number of customers who would have acquiesced in
higher prices.”). Further, the fact that doctors, not surprisingly, may not
focus on price, does not mean that cross-price elasticity is low with respect
to hospitals – which clearly are price sensitive and make the actual purchase
decisions – or that no hospital would be in a position to seek lower prices for
itself.

Cf. 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 3 (“Where price

discrimination is feasible, adverse competitive effects on targeted customers
can arise, even if such effects will not arise for other customers.”).5
The expert’s opinion was admittedly not based on statistical or econometric

5

The court’s findings recognize that hospitals are price sensitive, FF 93,
and they (not doctors) make the actual drug purchases, FF 88, and that
Lundbeck sought to influence non-physician members of hospital pharmacy
and therapeutics committees to gain access to hospital formularies, FF 83.
The court nonetheless concluded that “neonatologists are the relevant
consumers.” FF 113 (emphasis added). This was error because the question
isn’t an either/or issue. Plainly, while doctors are influential, the courts
findings demonstrate that hospitals play at least a significant role, and the
court failed to explain why hospitals could not make purchase decisions
based on price by persuading indifferent doctors to use one drug or other, as
Lundbeck itself sought to do. See FF 85.
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analysis of any evidence.6 Indeed, any estimate of the actual cross-price
elasticity in this case would be impossible. Economists define cross-price
elasticity as the percentage change in the quantity demanded for a product
associated with each one-percent change in the price of another product. See
2B Phillip E. Areeda et al., Antitrust Law ¶ 507a (3d ed. 2007). In antitrust
litigation it is estimated either by calculation of a simple statistical
correlation between price changes over time or, in the less common case in
which sufficient data are available, by econometric study of the relation
between prices.

Either approach presupposes the availability of data

showing the behavior of the two products when the price of one of them
changes. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Antitrust L., Econometrics: Legal,
Practical, and Technical Issues 269-309 (2005); Andrew M. Rosenfeld, The
Use of Economics in Antitrust Litigation and Counseling, 1986 Colum. Bus.
L. Rev. 49, 63-67.
6

According to the court, the expert “did not calculate a specific crossprice elasticity between NeoProfen and Indocin IV, [but] he testified that
that it is very low.” FF 115. In fact, he offered his opinion only at trial, in
reply to a question asked by the court, id., and no written report or statement
by him is apparently in evidence. Even on Lundbeck’s characterization of
his testimony, the most he did was speculate on the basis of his perception of
an institutional market failure. Def.’s Post Trial Br. at 4-5. Other courts
have held such unsupported expert testimony not even admissible under
Daubert, much less as sufficient to support fact findings. See, e.g.,
McLaughlin Equip. Co. v. Servaas, 2004 WL 1629603, at *6 (S.D. Ind.
2004) (“It is insufficient for an expert to merely mention cross-elasticity of
demand or supply; an analysis is required.”).
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Such a procedure would be impossible in this case. Prior to July
2006, only Indocin IV was available, and by that time Lundbeck had already
raised its price to $1500 per three-vial course of treatment. FF 57. When
Lundbeck introduced NeoProfen in July 2006, it offered the drug at $1450
per three-vial course of treatment (about one year later raising it to
$1552.50). FF 62. In another case that addressed the issue on similar facts,
the court ruled that proof of cross-elasticity cannot be demanded of the
plaintiff because without price variation it cannot be measured. See Nobody
in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 311 F. Supp.
2d 1048, 1082 (D. Colo. 2004).
Moreover, during the entire short period of their “competition” with
one another, NeoProfen and Indocin IV were both owned by the same
monopolist. A monopolist that owns the only two substitutes in a given
market has no incentive to price them competitively with each other or with
other products. Where, as here, they have always been priced by the same
monopolist, any estimate of their cross-price elasticity will be severely
flawed by an amplified version of the Cellophane fallacy—the mistake of
inferring cross-elasticity (or lack thereof) in a case where one or more
products was already being sold at a non-competitive price. See Am. Bar
Ass’n, Sect. of Antitrust L., Market Power Handbook 59-60 (2005)
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(describing the Cellophane fallacy); Kodak, 504 U.S. at 471 (“The existence
of significant substitution in the event of further price increases or even at
the current price does not tell us whether the defendant already exercises
significant market power.”).
Additionally, it is black letter law that when defining markets, courts
should refrain from giving monopolists the benefit of inferences from facts
peculiarly in their own control. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“To require that § 2 liability turn on a
plaintiff’s ability or inability to reconstruct the hypothetical marketplace
absent a defendant’s anticompetitive conduct would only encourage
monopolists to take more and earlier anticompetitive action.”); United States
v. Alum. Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424-25 (2d Cir. 1945) (excluding
“secondary” aluminum ingot from defendant Alcoa’s market because Alcoa
had some control over how much secondary there could be).
B.

The Elasticity Finding Conflicts With the Remainder of the
Opinion

The District Court’s finding of low cross-price elasticity also conflicts
with other findings of fact. The fact that “[w]hen launching NeoProfen, an
independent owner would not have disregarded Indocin IV’s price,” FF 63,
is evidence of significant cross-price elasticity. Moreover, upon the 2006
introduction of its new NeoProfen product, Lundbeck itself keyed the price
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of NeoProfen to the price of its existing Indocin product, minus a 3%
discount, to “[a]llow [sales] rep[resentatives] to spend more time selling
product differentiation in the NICU vs. spending time with the pharmacy
director on price . . . .” FF 82; see id. (also noting that small discount “will
not convert the economic driven vial splitting crowd”). Also, the court
found that, though Lundbeck always intended to increase the price of
Indocin IV after its acquisition, Lundbeck deliberately chose not to do so
until after it had completed negotiations with Abbott Laboratories for the
acquisition of NeoProfen.

“Lundbeck was concerned that Abbott

Laboratories would demand a higher price for the rights to NeoProfen if the
announcement of Indocin IV’s price increase took place before Lundbeck’s
acquisition of the rights to NeoProfen.” FF 58. But why would Abbott do
any such thing if the two products were not price competitors?
The court also found that in Lundbeck’s internal strategic analyses,
including in a presentation to its controlling shareholder, it perceived the two
drugs to be in direct price competition. See FF 79 (combining the two
products was expected to “allow us to cannibalize our Indocin IV sales in a
controlled manner . . . and continue to grow total company sales in the PDA
market”); FF 80 (combination would “allow Lundbeck to realize a more
stable revenue stream for both products within the PDA market”); FF 82
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(NeoProfen introduced with a 3% discount to Indocin IV to “take[] away
potential pharmaeconomic debate”); FF 84 (reasons that some customers
were not ordering NeoProfen included “Price”).
At trial, Lundbeck stressed one other point extensively, and the
District Court found it as a fact, but it turns out to show quite the opposite of
what Lundbeck urges.

Abbott Laboratories, the previous owner of

NeoProfen, had intended to introduce NeoProfen at a price significantly
higher than the then-prevailing price of its only competitor, Indocin IV. FF
61.

Lundbeck stressed that this fact proved that the two drugs do not

compete as to price. This argument is incorrect for at least two reasons.
First, that Abbott might have charged more for NeoProfen than Indocin IV
would show at most that they are not perfect substitutes. It is elementary
that products can be in the same product market without being perfect
substitutes.

See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.

(Cellophane), 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956) (antitrust does not “require that
products be fungible to be considered in the relevant market”). Second,
Abbott’s higher price projection was based on Abbott’s anticipation that the
Food & Drug Administration would approve a label for NeoProfen stating
its superiority over Indocin IV.

But, as mentioned above, the agency

ultimately rejected such a label. FF 16, 36, 61.
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C.

Lundbeck’s Efforts to Convince Doctors to Switch to
NeoProfen Would Make No Sense Unless the Products
Were Antitrust Substitutes

Lundbeck’s marketing strategy, to “accelerate the conversion of firstline PDA treatment from Indocin IV to [NeoProfen],” FF 80, would make no
sense if the products were not economic substitutes. A finding of seriously
irrational behavior calls at least for some explanation, but the court failed
utterly to supply it. As this Court has recognized, a finding of behavior
“contrary to [the actor’s] economic interests . . . is suspect,” Tenet, 186 F.3d
at 1054, because “antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences
from ambiguous evidence,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
Lundbeck was the owner of two separate products, which it acquired
for tens of millions of dollars. Absent other explanation, its rational strategy
would be to maximize the joint profit from selling both. And yet, it did
something very different. The company invested several million additional
dollars in a marketing effort to differentiate the two products on the basis of
safety and side effects.7 But if the products were not antitrust substitutes, a

7

Lundbeck established a massive, direct-sales marketing effort involving
dozens of its own sales personnel and scores more from Abbott Laboratories
(for which Lundbeck paid $2 million), to convince customers of
NeoProfen’s superiority. FF 34, 81-87.
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rational firm would not waste money trying to convince consumers that they
differ; consumers would already know.
More important, Lundbeck spent significant sums to acquire those two
separate drugs to treat the same condition, within six months of one another,
but then devoted itself to disparaging one of them to its consumers. FF 81.
There is no reason to believe on the court’s fact findings that sales of
NeoProfen should benefit Lundbeck any more than sales of Indocin, except
for the anticompetitive reason we elaborate below. It would be peculiar
indeed for the supplier of two separate, non-competing products, neither of
which promises a greater margin than the other, to discourage sales of either.
In this case Lundbeck not only did that, but apparently sought to kill off
demand for one of them altogether.
The District Court observed that “[w]ere NeoProfen and Indocin IV in
the same product market,” the push to discourage Indocin IV “would not
make sense.” FF 116. But in fact, it made perfect sense. Lundbeck sought
to convert Indocin users to NeoProfen because it expected generic
competition to Indocin, which would take more sales away from Indocin
than from NeoProfen. FF 64. The more it could differentiate NeoProfen in
the minds of customers, the more it could insulate NeoProfen from generic
competition.
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D.

The Court Misapplied Elementary Principles of Market
Definition

The District Court evidently believed that Indocin IV and NeoProfen
could not be in the same relevant product market if they would be affected
differently by the entry of generic Indocin, or if they were “distinct.” See FF
116 (concluding in penultimate sentence, “NeoProfen are Indocin IV are
distinct; their side effects differ.”).

This reflects a fundamental

misunderstanding about market definition. In particular, the court failed to
appreciate that a product market might be defined differently in two different
cases, even though they involve the same products, or that there can be a
broader relevant market that encompasses a smaller relevant market.
For example, in a merger between two identical versions of a product,
a non-merging differentiated product might be excluded because it does not
sufficiently constrain the ability of the merged firm to exercise market
power. See, e.g., Archer-Daniels-Midland, 866 F.2d at 243 (in acquisition
of high fructose corn syrup plants by HFCS maker, sugar was not in the
same relevant market as HFCS).

However, in a merger in which the

differentiated product is in fact being acquired, the differentiated products
may be in the same market because products outside that wider market do
not sufficiently constrain a hypothetical monopolist in the wider market. See
Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 Antitrust
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L.J. 129, 148 (2007) (“If one set of products or locations constitute a
relevant antitrust market, it is likely that one or more larger sets of products
and locations that encompass the initial market would also be an antitrust
market.”); Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325 (concept of “submarkets”
recognizes that narrow market may exist within a broader relevant market);
e.g., Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1301 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing “a
submarket of the dry sanitizers market is not inherently contradictory with
recognizing a dry sanitizers market”).
Thus, a merger between Indocin IV and a generic equivalent might
well exclude NeoProfen from the relevant market, but that is not inconsistent
with a relevant market here that includes both NeoProfen and Indocin IV. A
related problem is that the court was apparently led astray by Lundbeck in
assuming that only if consumers switched products in response to a small
price increase (5-10%) could the products be considered in the same relevant
market. See Def. Lundbeck Inc.’s Post Trial Br. at 37-38, 42-43. However,
two products can be in the same relevant market even if a significant price
increase is required to get consumers to switch, if there are no other better
substitutes to the products that would constrain a monopolist’s pricing. See
Olin, 986 F.2d at 1302 (“a finding of cross-elasticity is not precluded by the
fact that a higher price increase is necessary to induce a switch”).
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CONCLUSION
There is no dispute that Lundbeck had monopoly power with respect
to its Indocin IV product, regardless of whether the relevant market included
NeoProfen. And there is no dispute that had NeoProfen not been acquired
by Lundbeck, non-price competition would have flourished. By its
acquisition, the monopolist Lundbeck preempted the possibility that price
competition would also flourish. Absent extraordinary circumstances not
present on the record in this case, such a monopoly-protecting merger is
patently anticompetitive and illegal under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Accordingly, the decision of the District Court
should be reversed.
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